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Frontiers of Ethnic Brutality in an African 
City: Explaining the Spread and Recurrence 
of Violent Conflict in Jos, Nigeria 
Kingsley L. Madueke and Floris F. Vermeulen  
Abstract: There is considerable consensus among scholars of ethnic 
riots that ethnically mixed areas are more prone to collective violence 
than segregated ones. The conclusion is based on studies that compare 
levels of violence between segregated and mixed localities. While this 
addresses disparities between settlements of dissimilar ethnic composi-
tion, variations in the spread of violence across ethnically mixed areas 
remain a mystery. Seeking to explicate these variations, we propose an 
approach that examines not only the ethnic composition of a neighbour-
hood, but also its location in relation to adjoining neighbourhoods of 
similar or dissimilar ethnic makeup and their shared boundaries. Based 
on ethnographic fieldwork in Jos, a violence-ridden Nigerian city, we 
demonstrate that ethnically mixed areas located between segregated ones 
experience more incidents of violence than mixed neighbourhoods not 
comparably located. Our findings have both academic and practical im-
plications. 
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Introduction
Once considered one of Nigeria’s most peaceful areas, the city of Jos 
recently became troubled by ethnic violence of an enormous scale and 
intensity. Over 1,000 people were killed in a series of ethnoreligious riots 
that lasted six days in September 2001. After a momentary calm within 
the city – during which hundreds were massacred in the rural districts of 
Plateau South – urban violence resumed in November 2008. This time it 
claimed over 700 lives within two days.1 Hostilities once again engulfed 
the city in January 2010, during which at least 200 people were killed 
within Jos proper and, from March onwards, when more than 400 people 
were murdered by armed militias in the outlying local government areas 
(LGAs) of Jos South, Barking Ladi, and Riyom. Overall, more than 5,000 
people were killed between 2001 and 2010, distinguishing the Jos riots as 
some of the most atrocious in Nigeria’s modern history. Though contes-
tations over indigene rights and political representation are at the heart 
of the conflict, violent clashes have been primarily between Christians 
and Muslims. This is because religious and ethnic identities overlap, 
albeit not so neatly, and religion offers a wider base for mobilising polit-
ical support. However, though the literature traditionally portrays perpe-
trators of violence in Jos as aggregate groups of Christians and Muslims, 
underneath the cloak of religion are diverse actors that can be further 
differentiated. On both sides, as subsequent sections will show, the 
armed mobs that engaged in violence in Jos were assemblages of local 
criminals, ethnopolitical activists, vigilantes, party loyalists, neighbour-
hood leaders, retired security officers, residents, and a range of other 
individuals all driven by diverse interests and motivations. This article’s 
overarching objective is to empirically illustrate how one neighbour-
hood’s demography and location rendered it vulnerable to the cross-
neighbourhood activities of these violent hordes.    
Experts on Jos, like their counterparts in other cities struggling with 
similar conflagrations, seek to explain the factors shaping the spread and 
levels of violence (see Krause 2017; Bunte and Vinson 2016; Scacco 
2012). Along with population density and poverty, the broader literature 
highlights ethnic segregation as an important demographic variable in a 
neighbourhood’s susceptibility to violence (see Madueke 2018a). Views 
are conflicting, however, on how this relationship works (Bhavnani and 
Choi 2012). One perspective holds that ethnically segregated environ-
ments are more prone to violence. According to this view, segregation 
1 Plateau South is one of Plateau State’s three politically subdivided senatorial 
zones. The others are Plateau North, where Jos is located, and Plateau Central. 
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engenders violence by breeding in-group solidarity and out-group re-
sentment (Boal 1972). Another argument runs in the opposite direction, 
maintaining that ethnically mixed areas are more prone to violence, and 
groups should be kept apart in different residential units to avert violent 
clashes (Kaufmann 1996). 
Contrary to the rather determinist stance of these views, both ethni-
cally segregated and mixed neighbourhoods in Jos have had their share 
of violence. Segregated neighbourhoods such as Angwan Rogo and 
Angwan Rukuba as well as ethnically diverse areas such as Nasarawa 
Gwong and Ali Kazaure experienced similarly high levels of violence 
(see Human Rights Watch 2001, 2009). We propose that in addition to a 
neighbourhood’s ethnic composition, its location in relation to adjoining 
neighbourhoods of similar or dissimilar ethnic composition accounts for 
its vulnerability to violence. Specifically, we argue that ethnically mixed 
neighbourhoods that are sandwiched between rivalling segregated settle-
ments experience more incidents of violence than mixed areas not com-
parably located. The article will demonstrate that this is because rival 
armed mobs in the neighbouring segregated areas compete for territorial 
and political control of the adjoining ethnically mixed settlement usually 
considered to be a “no man’s land” and a prize to be taken by the stronger. 
We develop our argument in four steps: First, we discuss relevant 
perspectives in related literature and then situate our argument. Second, 
we analyse the historical and contemporary underpinnings of ethnic 
conflict and violence in Jos and then elucidate our design and methods. 
Third, we scrutinise the case of Ali Kazaure and how its ethnic composi-
tion and location contribute to making it a site of persistent collective 
violence. Specifically, we show how spatial adjacency and social networks 
that criss-cross the shared boundaries of Ali Kazaure and the rivalling 
adjoining neighbourhoods make it easy for external actors to infiltrate 
the neighbourhood. In doing this, we also show that despite the chang-
ing ethnic composition of the neighbourhood, levels of violence re-
mained fairly constant, indicating that ethnic composition alone cannot 
account for variations. Fourth, we cross-validate our findings in Ali Ka-
zaure by surveying four other ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, two of 
which are sandwiched between rivalling segregated areas. 
Related Literature 
Scholars agree that a locality’s ethnic composition affects its susceptibil-
ity to violence, but they disagree on how the two variables interact. One 
perspective holds that ethnic segregation promotes violence (Peach 
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2007); the other maintains that ethnic diversity increases the likelihood 
of frictions, thereby fostering confrontations (Kaufmann 1996). Empiri-
cal evidence is conflicting, supporting one perspective in some instances 
and disproving the same in other contexts. For example, Bhavnani et al. 
(2014: 1) found that the increased levels of segregation that followed 
frequent violent unrests in the 1960s and 1970s in Belfast helped prevent 
resurgence in subsequent years. In Baghdad, Weidmann and Salehyan 
(2013) similarly noted that a sharp decline in group violence correspond-
ed to a sharp rise in residential segregation. But evidence from other 
cases suggests the opposite: Cunningham and Gregory (2014) demon-
strate that segregation has contributed to deepening sectarian animosity. 
They observed that the demarcations in Belfast known as peace lines, 
constructed to segregate Catholics and Protestants, have accomplished 
the unintended objective of formalising religio-political differences that 
feed into a cycle of reproducing spatial and social distance. Rather than 
entrenching order, such peace lines have served to concretise narratives 
of inclusion and exclusion that are crucial for the perpetuation of collec-
tive violence. Jarman and O’Halloran (2001) also note that such inter-
faces, while aiming to separate sectarian rivals, have counterproductively 
increased the incidence of rioting.    
While these perspectives offer relevant insights into the factors that 
make different spatial contexts riot-prone, they do not pay attention to 
how the location of a neighbourhood in relation to surrounding areas of 
similar or dissimilar ethnic compositions can shape its vulnerability to 
violence. Moreover, overlooking the salience of neighbourhood location 
is partly responsible for the conflicting conclusions in the literature (Ma-
dueke 2018b). In Jos, both ethnically segregated and mixed settlements 
experienced some form of violence as the riots raged. However, incidents 
of violence significantly declined in segregated neighbourhoods as they 
became totally homogeneous over time (Krause 2011: 32). This indicates 
that complete ethnic segregation does curb violence, at least in the short 
term, if not permanently. One study found groups in the segregated areas 
of Jos to be more capable of mobilising and defending their neighbour-
hoods against invasion by external fighters than their counterparts in 
mixed settlements (Madueke 2018b). This piece of evidence partly ac-
counts for variations in the spread of violence between ethnically mixed 
and homogeneously segregated settlements as far as Jos is concerned.  
Nonetheless, a good part of the puzzle related to ethnic composi-
tion and collective violence is still unsolved. There is no adequate expla-
nation for why some mixed neighbourhoods become sites of persistent 
violence while other equally diverse areas remain relatively peaceful. 
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Experts on Jos have made important contributions towards understand-
ing this enigma. One such effort maps how the city’s neighbourhoods 
transformed from mundane residential areas to spaces of ethnic differen-
tiation and violence. It argues that through exploring two distinct types 
of socio-spatial settings – ethnic strongholds and frontiers – we can 
understand the spread and patterns of violence in the city (Madueke 
2018b). In her analysis of variations in levels of violence, Krause (2017) 
found that what distinguished non-violent neighbourhoods from those 
that experienced violence was the presence of a civilian violence-preven-
tion network. In other words, neighbourhoods that were equally vulner-
able but stayed unscathed have civilian networks to thank. Based on a 
paired comparison of a violent and a non-violent violent neighbourhood, 
she empirically demonstrated how a joint Christian–Muslim patrol and 
influential community leaders contributed to making Dadin Kowa an 
oasis of relative calm even when nearby areas were boiling.  
Further, Jos-focused literature emphasises power-sharing and pov-
erty as important explanations for violence and non-violence across the 
city’s neighbourhoods and districts. Comparing Jos and Chikun, Bunte 
and Vinson (2016) observed how localities with a power-sharing ar-
rangement are less likely to experience ethnic violence; they attribute this 
to the tone of politicians being more conciliatory and there being more 
mutual trust among members of the public than in areas without such 
arrangements. Explaining why poor neighbourhoods of Jos experienced 
higher levels of violence than the wealthier ones, Scacco (2012) empiri-
cally illustrated how poverty increases the likelihood of riot participation. 
The literature has long identified poverty as one of the structural under-
pinnings of ethnic violence in Africa (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000), but 
explaining the relations at work was always a challenge. Scacco (2012) 
helped fill this gap by arguing that in circumstances where authorities 
cannot protect their citizens, poor residents of deprived areas will pick 
up arms to defend themselves in the face of riots. 
Such perspectives advance our understanding of factors affecting 
the spread and level of violence, but some gaps persist. To start with, 
while the presence of a civilian violence-prevention network does sug-
gest why some neighbourhoods were violence-free during some riots, an 
unanswered question is why other neighbourhoods with similar civilian 
violence-prevention arrangements, though initially non-violent, did ex-
perience riots at some point. For example, reports indicate that  
in some areas, Christians and Muslims set up joint patrols in a bid to 
limit the spread of violence, but it became difficult to maintain these 
once the fighting had escalated. (Human Rights Watch 2001: 9)  
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Such civilian networks fall within Keegan’s (1993) “contingent” factors 
as opposed to “permanent” operating factors such as physical terrain. 
Contingent factors are important for determining violence and non-vio-
lence circumstantially, but factors such as neighbourhood location and 
boundaries affect vulnerability to violence in a more permanent sense. 
We agree with Bunte and Vinson’s (2016) argument that power sharing 
explains variations in the spread of violence at the levels of LGAs and 
districts. However, there are also variations within LGAs and districts 
(e.g. across neighbourhoods and even streets) that power sharing at these 
higher spatial scales cannot account for. We consider poverty, as argued 
by Scacco (2012), a crucial factor to consider in accounting for riot par-
ticipation; for our purposes, however, it serves more as a control variable 
than an explanatory one. 
We maintain that variations in the spread of violence across demo-
graphically identical neighbourhoods remain a mystery because research 
has not adequately considered the location of a neighbourhood in rela-
tion to adjoining areas. Bridging perspectives in the broader literature on 
ethnic composition, location, and collective violence, we propose that 
when considering susceptibility to violence, it is not just the neighbour-
hood’s ethnic composition that matters, but also its location in relation 
to surrounding neighbourhoods of similar or dissimilar ethnic composi-
tion.  
We are not the first to consider how locational attributes affect a 
neighbourhood’s propensity for collective violence (for case studies of 
other cities, see Calame and Charlesworth 2011). Jarman and O’Halloran 
(2001) observed that in Belfast the “buffer zone” – a type of interface 
where a mixed settlement falls between two segregated neighbourhoods – 
is more violence-prone than homogeneous neighbourhoods divided by 
sharp boundaries. The underlying logic is that the buffer zone is a place 
of friction, where two opposing communities come into partial contact. 
This is consistent with findings related to neighbourhood conflicts in 
New York. Legewie and Schaeffer’s (2016) study found that mixed 
neighbourhoods sandwiched between rivalling segregated neighbour-
hoods were more disposed to conflict than fully segregated neighbour-
hoods with clearly defined boundaries. Apart from being sites of contes-
tation over shared resources, such boundary neighbourhoods are 
contentious because they are spatial contexts where the homogeneous 
community life that characterises the segregated neighbourhood is 
threatened (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016). Although the horrendous 
violence in Jos does not neatly parallel “the Troubles” of Belfast or New 
York’s neighbourhood scuffles, the dynamic that underlies buffer zones 
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and contested boundaries is similar. It explains how the location of 
neighbourhoods in relation to adjoining settlements can contribute to 
making them more or less susceptible to violence.  
This type of socio-spatial setting is highly vulnerable to violence be-
cause ethnopolitical networks from the adjoining segregated areas com-
pete to dominate it. The key objective is to expel rival group members so 
as to establish territorial and electoral dominance. Using violence to 
expel residents who are likely to vote for an opponent has been well 
documented in Kenya (see Kasara 2014). Riots offer a crucial window to 
displace members of the rival group. Through their connections with co-
ethnics in the ethnically mixed areas, ethnopolitical networks from segre-
gated areas may infiltrate or fully invade the mixed areas when violence 
erupts. Violence perpetrated by ethnopolitical networks, moreover, pre-
sents both opportunities and guises, for individuals to commit atrocities 
based on economic, personal, and other motivations (Kalyvas 2003). 
The notion of the frontier sheds light on the socio-spatial setting 
discussed in this article. Defining the frontier, Kotek noted that, first, it 
is an area located “on fault-lines between ethnic, religious or ideological 
wholes” (Kotek 1999: 228). Second, it is characterised by contestations 
and struggles for political control between rival groups. Third, it symbol-
ises bigger conflicts, being “emblematic of larger disputed areas or 
zones” (Kotek 1999: 231). To these distinctive features, we add a fourth: 
at the frontier, the struggle for control is not restricted to residents with-
in the neighbourhood, but also involves actors from adjoining areas. 
Although Kotek’s frontier originally referred to higher spatial levels such 
as cities and regions, it has gained currency in characterising battleground 
neighbourhoods or settlements known to experience intense violence in 
conflict-ridden cities. Boal (2002) used the concept to explain Belfast’s 
contentious geography and the spatial patterns of Catholic–Protestant 
violence.  
As a result of political developments, violence over the years, in-
creased segregation, and the militarisation of the populace, the neigh-
bourhoods of Jos have transformed from mundane residential areas to 
strategic spaces of ethnic dissention and combat. This transformation 
has led to the emergence of two types of socio-spatial settings: ethnic 
strongholds and frontiers. Strongholds are locales of ethnic exclusivity, 
characterised by ethnic homogeneity and territorial dominance (Madueke 
2018b). Frontiers are sites of fierce competition, contestations, and tus-
sles for territorial and political control. The central argument of this 
article, thus, is that during riots the frontiers of Jos were not only subject 
to internal wrangling but also experienced more strain as external social 
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networks in the adjoining strongholds exploited their trans-neighbour-
hood ties to extend the boundaries of their territorial and political con-
trol. Before looking at the fine details of this proposition, however, it is 
important to first map the historical and contemporary underpinnings of 
ethnic conflict and violence in Jos.  
Identity Politics, Ethnic Conflict, and Violence in 
Jos
Researchers have shed light on the historical and social underpinnings of 
ethnic competition in Jos by describing the waves of migration from 
Northern Nigeria (Freund 1981), the establishment of the city in 1915, 
and the segregationist socio-spatial organisation of residential settlements 
by the colonial administration (Plotnicov 1971). The inflow of migrants 
from the south intensified economic competition with earlier migrants 
from the north, resulting in one of the earliest violent clashes in Jos. 
Clear connections have been established between these historical ante-
cedents and regional identity politics in postcolonial Nigeria (Logams 
1985; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The Hausa forms the majority group 
in northern Nigeria and is by far the most politically dominant. At the 
dawn of independence, the minority ethnic groups in north-central Nige-
ria, including in Jos, found themselves under the hegemonic clutch of 
the Hausa (Logams 1985). Struggles by the minorities to break free and 
assert their political autonomy started during colonial rule and continued 
after its end. The incompatibility of these interests has translated into 
local power struggles, which have in recent decades become violent in 
tone. The violent conflict between the indigenous groups of Jos and the 
Hausa is part of this and is, in essence, a microcosmic expression of 
these political struggles (see Best 2007).  
The intense competition among ethnic identities is compounded by 
Nigeria’s citizenship crisis and ambiguities surrounding indigeneity. Ni-
gerian authorities distinguish between indigenes and non-indigenes (or 
settlers) within states and LGAs (Bach 1997). All over Nigeria, the con-
stituent states and LGAs assign certain rights and privileges to persons 
and groups considered indigenes. The Constitution of Nigeria, however, 
only vaguely defines the term, leaving it open to subjective interpreta-
tions that are often conflicting. While some base indigeneity on autoch-
thony, others see it in terms of long-time residence and aiding an area’s 
development. The indigenous groups of Jos lay their claims to city own-
ership and consider themselves the only bona fide indigenes because, 
they argue, the city was built on land inhabited by their ancestors since 
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time immemorial (Ostien 2009). The Hausa proclaim they qualify as 
indigenes because they have been around for an extensive period and 
contributed to the growth of the city since its formal establishment a 
century ago (see Best 2007). What is more, being a Nigerian citizen does 
not guarantee the privileges that indigene status does, so who qualifies as 
an indigene has become a pervasive issue and constitutes a prominent 
underlying causality in ethnic violence in Jos (Madueke 2018a).  
Though its history of ethnic riots goes back to the 1930s, deadly vio-
lence in the twenty-first century is what earned Jos notoriety. The scale is 
unprecedented and continues to baffle observers. As Higazi (2007) 
notes, religion played a prominent role during the recent rounds of riots 
in Jos and did so in a way distinct from that of earlier clashes across 
ethnolinguistic or regional boundaries. The first large-scale violence to 
occur in modern-day Jos was in 2001, following the appointment of a 
Hausa man as coordinator of a poverty-alleviation programme in the 
LGA of Jos North. The violence started in a slum southeast of the city 
centre. Christians and Muslims engaged in open clashes, using sticks, 
cutlasses, bows and arrows, spears, petrol bombs, and locally made fire-
arms. Within a remarkably short time, similar clashes erupted in different 
parts of the city, with mobs killing, maiming, and burning. The police 
were overwhelmed; it took the military to finally quell the violence six 
days later. Approximately 1,000 people were killed in the pandemonium. 
Another round of violence almost engulfed the city in May 2002, but 
calm was restored and the violence did not spread to other parts of the 
city. It started with skirmishes between Christian and Muslim party loyal-
ists at an electoral registration centre and ended in mobs rampaging 
around the Angwan Rukuba, Eto Baba, Nasarawa Gwong, and Dogon 
Dutse areas. In the end, approximately 50 people were killed and up to 
100 vehicles burnt (Nyam and Ayuba 2016: 367). Yet, this was minimal 
compared to what happened in 2001, or what was to come in 2008. That 
horrendous violence was directly linked to the LGA elections held on 27 
November 2008. Once again, armed mobs killed, maimed, and vandal-
ised. After two days of fighting, 700 people were dead and hundreds of 
buildings and vehicles had been burnt and/or destroyed. Another round 
of violence occurred in 2010. Unlike the episodes in 2001 and 2008, 
which were related to (elected or appointed) political positions, this one 
was sparked by a seemingly trivial event. On 17 January 2010 a Muslim 
whose home was destroyed in Dutse Uku during the 2008 violence 
brought labourers in to start renovating the house, which he owned. An 
altercation then ensued between the labourers, who were Muslim, and 
the area’s Christian residents on their way to church that Sunday morn-
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ing. As in previous violent episodes, before long the altercation spiralled 
into mass killings, replicated in neighbourhoods across the city (Madueke 
2018a). 
At the time of writing, Jos is enjoying what can be described as a 
semblance of peace. The visible presence of a military taskforce and the 
reconciliatory efforts of peace-building networks have contributed to 
creating some stability. While the city has not recorded any incidents of 
clashes since 2015, it is still reeling from the large-scale violence of the 
past. A high crime rate, drug abuse, mutual suspicion, and fear pervade 
the city’s divided society. Neighbourhoods are characterised by a strong 
presence of miscellaneous networks that combine the characteristics of 
vigilantes, ethnopolitical interest groups, and criminal cartels posturing as 
vanguards of defence. These emergent assemblages pose a major security 
challenge even in times of relative stability (Madueke 2018b). 
Research Design and Data 
This article is based on an in-depth case study of levels and patterns of 
violence in Ali Kazaure. This ethnically mixed neighbourhood in the city 
centre of Jos is located between two segregated settlements, the large 
Muslim area of Angwan Rogo to the north, and the Christian settlement 
of Apata to the south. Inasmuch as this in-depth study zooms in on one 
neighbourhood, we pay close attention to Ali Kazaure’s adjacent neigh-
bourhoods. In addition, we worked with a selection of four ethnically 
mixed areas that are demographically, socially, and economically similar, 
though they differ in terms of location and the ethnic composition of the 
adjoining settlements. Like Ali Kazaure, two of these neighbourhoods 
are sandwiched between segregated settlements; the other two, although 
also ethnically diverse, are not. These secondary cases are examined, 
though only briefly, in order to achieve the kind of control required to 
avoid spurious claims and to cross-validate findings. 
We started by comparing recurrence and persistence of violence 
across all the aforementioned ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. We did 
this by scanning official reports of violence and hospital records to de-
termine which of the neighbourhoods experienced violence and which 
did not. We did this for each neighbourhood for all three episodes of 
ethnic riots. To identify and differentiate patterns and levels of violence, 
we relied on extensive interviews and discussions with riot participants, 
surviving victims, eyewitnesses, and other residents. Comparing and 
combining information from the official reports, hospital records, and 
our interviews, we created three categories for classifying each neigh-
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bourhood’s distinct experience of violence: major violence, prolonged 
clashes lasting several hours and involving a large group of people; no 
violence; and sporadic violence, isolated and often sporadic violent inci-
dents involving much smaller groups and lasting only a short while.  
Table 1 presents two neighbourhood samples.  
Table 1. Samples of Violence Levels in Two Neighbourhoods 
Neighbourhood Location 2001 2008 2010 
Farin Gada Not sandwiched NV SV SV 
Nasarawa 
Gwong Sandwiched MV MV MV 
Note: MV = major violence, NV = no violence, SV = sporadic violence.  
Table 1 shows how Nasarawa Gwong, an ethnically mixed neighbour-
hood sandwiched between rivalling segregated settlements, experienced 
major (persistent) violence in all three episodes of ethnic riots. By con-
trast, Farin Gada, an ethnically mixed neighbourhood not sandwiched 
between segregated settlements, experienced no violence in 2001 and 
only isolated, short-lived incidents of violence in 2008 and 2010. Based 
on this, we can say Nasarawa Gwong experienced more recurrent and 
persistent violence because it was violence-ridden in all three episodes of 
riots; in all three instances, fighting was prolonged and involved a large 
number of people.  
We relied on a variety of data sets from fieldwork conducted in Jos 
between 2015 and 2017. During this time, besides gathering significant 
archival materials and official reports of violence, research visits were 
frequent to Ali Kazaure, its adjoining areas, and several other neighbour-
hoods. The many interviews and other forms of formal and informal 
discussions conducted with a diverse group of informants are elaborated 
later in this section. 
We used the ethnic composition of public primary schools as a 
proxy for the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood in which they 
are located. We analysed common entrance-examination registers for the 
graduating classes of 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 as representative 
samples of the school since these pupils all sit for the common entrance 
examination, a final written test taken in order to graduate from primary 
school and gain admission into secondary school. The class register car-
ries the full names of the pupils, year of graduation, and other infor-
mation. To analyse the data, we scanned the names and categorised them 
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as either “Muslim” or “Christian.” In Jos and across much of Nigeria, an 
individual’s name is usually an indicator of his or her religion. But be-
cause this is not always the case, we complemented this method with 
extensive discussions with school principals and teachers to further as-
certain students’ group identity and Christian–Muslim proportions. 
The choice of public primary schools was informed by two consid-
erations: First, children who attend them come from poor families un-
able to afford to drive their children to school. These pupils thus reside 
in the respective neighbourhoods where the schools are located. Private 
primary schools would not have been an apt data source, because their 
pupils tend to have parents with cars and can therefore be driven to 
school elsewhere. Secondary schools, public or private, would also be 
unsuitable, because their students usually converge from different neigh-
bourhoods. As a second consideration, public primary schools have very 
comprehensive records that go back decades, whereas most private 
schools in Jos are recently established.  
We also collected hospital records of victims of violence and police 
reports to determine the spread of violence. Hospital records of violent 
clashes comprise demographic information such as the name, ethnicity, 
religion, and address of a victim. They also contain forensic information 
on the nature and severity of injuries, sites on the body where injury 
occurred, and any weapon used. For this study, we collected records 
from four hospitals that received and treated victims of violence within 
and around the city of Jos from 2001 onwards. Police records specify 
dates, times, and neighbourhoods or streets where violence occurred; 
sometimes, numbers of casualties and arrested suspects are also included.  
For the purpose of this article, we conducted and analysed 86 inter-
views concerning the three episodes of violence that occurred in the city 
between 2001 and 2010: 23 in the ethnically mixed neighbourhood of Ali 
Kazaure, 19 in the Christian stronghold of Apata, and 24 in the Muslim 
stronghold of Angwan Rogo. Five interviews were conducted in each of 
the four other ethnically mixed areas: Nasarawa Gwong, Congo-Russia, 
Farin Gada, and Mister Ali. Most of the interviews were conducted be-
tween 2015 and 2017, but others were conducted between 2010 and 
2013. Because of the sensitive nature of the study, interviewees and in-
formants were sampled mainly through snowballing. However, geo-
graphical representation, length of residency, and proximity to and 
knowledge of the issues discussed were important considerations in the 
sampling process. Because violence forms the core of the study, we were 
particularly interested in hearing directly from riot participants, victims, 
and eyewitnesses. 
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The interviews stemmed from three main discussion prompts: 1) 
describe how you experienced violence in your neighbourhood, 2) tell us 
about the main participants in the violence and where they came from, 
and 3) describe how the violence affected your neighbourhood in terms 
of social networks (inter-/intra-ethnic relations, neighbourhood associa-
tions, etc.). Each of these discussion points was complemented by sever-
al follow-up queries that sought to dig deeper than ritualised narratives 
that may have been rehearsed and told over the years. The duration of 
the interviews varied, with the longest just under 90 minutes and the 
shortest only 15 minutes. We employed a thematic system in analysing 
the data. On the basis of the data and existing literature, we created three 
coding categories: how violence started (the main instigators and their 
origin – from within or outside the neighbourhood), patterns of violence 
(pogroms, clashes, or sporadic isolated incidents), and effects on inter-
group and intragroup relations (civic and quotidian networks). After 
disaggregating the transcribed text into these categories, we ordered the 
categories into themes before sequencing those themes into a chronolog-
ical account. 
The data sets are not without some biases and limitations. In rela-
tion to ethnic composition, it is possible for a group to be overrepre-
sented or underrepresented in a school or a class simply by chance. We 
believe, however, that these chance possibilities have a way of balancing 
each other out. There are widespread allegations that the police force 
favours Christians since it is controlled by the state government. But 
since we are not interested in adjudging who is the aggressor and who is 
the victim, but rather being able to corroborate the spread of violence, 
police bias is of little consequence for the outcome of our study. Ulti-
mately, to circumvent these problems – and recognising the possibility of 
people’s memories being distorted or subjects being deliberately mislead-
ing in interviews – we conducted a “ground-truthing” exercise that in-
volved visits to the neighbourhoods and extensive informal discussions 
with residents.  
Ali Kazaure’s Location and Cross-Boundary
Violence
In this subsection, we empirically demonstrate how Ali Kazaure’s loca-
tion between rivalling segregated settlements made it susceptible to inva-
sion by external armed mobs from the surrounding areas. Following this, 
we explain why joint patrols aimed at preventing incursion by rivalling 
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rampaging mobs from the two ends of the neighbourhood ultimately 
proved futile.  
During all the major episodes of violence in Jos, residents of Ali 
Kazaure agreed not to engage in any form of violence and to ensure that 
potential troublemakers from outside the neighbourhood were prevented 
from coming in. In all instances, this security arrangement worked up to 
a point but eventually became overwhelmed by pressure from external 
armed mobs. When the 2001 riots started, Ali Kazaure’s vigilantes mobil-
ised other young residents and kept vigil to ensure no external fighters 
came in. This arrangement collapsed the next morning when large armed 
mobs from the adjoining areas mounted pressure and penetrated the two 
opposite ends of the neighbourhood. Hordes of fighters from the Chris-
tian areas of Apata, Chorbe Junction, and Busa Buji had marched into 
the neighbourhood and staged a front near the Catholic church.2 Armed 
mobs from the Muslim areas of Angwan Rogo and Yan Kaji camped on 
the other side of the neighbourhood around Eid Square. Figure 1 shows 
movements of fighters into Ali Kazaure. Some months after the incident, 
a woman described the day’s events in an interview with Human Rights 
Watch: 
Muslim youths from Angwan Rogo came to Ali Kazaure. They set 
fire to the Fatima Catholic Cathedral near our house. They had 
guns and petrol bombs in bottles. Youths from Apata were 
fighting those from across the street. When the Muslims came 
with guns, most of them ran away. Some Christians then also got 
guns and launched a counter-attack. In Ali Kazaure both Christian 
and Muslim houses were burnt. There was a battleground in the 
middle. In Apata, most of the houses burnt were Muslim. (Human 
Rights Watch 2001: 10) 
The same pattern of violence was repeated during the 2008 and 2010 
riots. In 2010 word about the violence came to Ali Kazaure around 11 
a.m. on Sunday, 17 January. Contending armed mobs marched in from 
the adjoining segregated settlements. Earlier, some prominent individuals 
had intervened, and residents on both sides had agreed that peace should 
be maintained at all costs. Vigilantes and other young males that lived in 
the predominantly Muslim northern part of the neighbourhood were to 
watch that area to prevent troublemakers from the Muslim neighbour-
hoods of Angwan Rogo and Yan Kaji from coming in. Their counter-
parts in the mainly Christian southern half of the neighbourhood were to 
prevent potential fighters from Apata, Chorbe Junction, and Busa Buji 
2 Interview with youth leader, 16 May 2016. 
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from penetrating. These efforts succeeded at first, but eventually the 
barricades on both sides of the neighbourhoods collapsed and fighters 
from the surrounding neighbourhoods invaded. Christians claimed the 
Muslim residents were the first to let their co-ethnics from surrounding 
areas in. One vigilante from the Christian side said some of his Muslim 
neighbours assisted the invading fighters by identifying the homes of 
Christians for attack. Muslims made similar accusations of Christian 
residents. One resident of the Muslim side said he saw two Christian 
residents of the neighbourhood leading fighters from Apata.3  
Figure 1. Movements of Armed Mobs into Ali Kazaure 
Source: Map created by author. 
There is no official figure of how many people were killed in Ali Kazau-
re, but some riot participants and eyewitnesses estimate more than 50 
people could have been killed in the two days of fighting in 2008. 
3 Interview with former resident of Ali Kazaure, 16 May 2016. 
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Though some of these deaths were said to have resulted from arbitrary 
killings by security forces, discussions indicate most of them were perpe-
trated by external armed mobs from the adjoining quarters. Apart from 
these deaths and hundreds of injuries, some 133 buildings were de-
stroyed, making the neighbourhood one of the most physically devastat-
ed (Human Rights Watch 2009: 19–20).  
There is no indication that the change in ethnic composition in Ali 
Kazaure affected levels of violence. As indicated in Table 2, one out-
come of the several episodes was an increasing level of ethnic segrega-
tion. Between 2001 and 2010, many Christians either fled the neighbour-
hood or relocated further south, closer to the Christian stronghold of 
Apata. From a fairly mixed area with a Christian–Muslim percentage 
ratio of 52 to 48 in 2000, the population had become 91 per cent Muslim 
by 2010. Despite this huge change in ethnic composition, nothing indi-
cated lessening or heightening ethnic violence. Levels of violence re-
maining fairly constant despite the change in ethnic composition points 
to factors beyond ethnic composition.  











1992 242 148 61 94 39 
1995 121 84 69 37 31 
2000 179 104 58 75 42 
2008 201 26 13 175 87 
2010 131 12 9 120 91 
Evidence strongly suggests the different incidents of violence in Ali 
Kazaure were both instigated and sustained by external forces. Although 
residents of the area also contributed to the violence, it could have been 
managed and possibly mitigated before it got out of hand if not for the 
“bad people from these other areas that kept attacking,” according to a 
resident who was part of the joint patrols in 2001 and 2008. Several other 
residents also emphasise the role of external armed groups in fuelling 
violence in the area.4 Through alliances with co-ethnics in the frontier, 
politicians and local thugs and gang members from the adjoining segre-
gated settlements found it easy to infiltrate and even invade whenever 
violence erupted.5 The boundaries Ali Kazaure shares with adjacent 
4 Interview with residents, 13 March 2017. 
5 Interview with politician, 13 February 2017.  
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settlements make it easy for external groups to sneak in and out with the 
tacit support of their co-ethnics within. The next subsection zooms in on 
these factors.  
The Quest for Votes and the Struggle for the 
Soul of Ali Kazaure
Having highlighted the different instances of cross-neighbourhood vio-
lence in Ali Kazaure, the next logical step is to explain how the neigh-
bourhood’s location between two rivalling segregated communities en-
hanced it. Specifically, this subsection illustrates how struggles for 
territorial and political dominance by rivalling ethnopolitical, criminal 
networks and various other actors rendered the neighbourhood volatile. 
Based on its demographic and locational attributes, Ali Kazaure is distin-
guished by the social factors that define Kotek’s (1999) frontier. Strug-
gles for political control form part of group dynamics in the neighbour-
hood. Group relations are beleaguered by the question of who “owns” 
the settlement. Ethnopolitical and criminal networks are perpetually 
trying to assert themselves against rival coalitions. Struggles for political 
and territorial ascendancy manifest in the form of contestations and 
skirmishes at polling units during elections. The struggle for the owner-
ship and soul of Ali Kazaure is a reflection of a broader conflict at the 
city level. The predominantly Christian indigenes and the mostly Muslim 
Hausa are entangled in a longstanding feud over who “owns” the city. 
This partly explains why the struggle for the control of the area is not 
restricted to residents within.  
To appreciate the struggles in Ali Kazaure, we must first understand 
how things work in the polling units of Jos. Polling units in segregated 
areas are usually “owned” and controlled by local politicians through 
criminals who dictate what happens at these units during elections. Resi-
dents are coerced into voting for the criminals’ benefactor. In extreme 
cases, these antisocial elements hijack the ballot box and thumbprint the 
ballot papers as they wish (see Sadiq and Ibrahim 2015). That is why the 
voting pattern in the polling units located within the segregated neigh-
bourhoods that border Ali Kazaure is unidirectional, as illustrated in the 
examples shown in Table 3. Almost 99 per cent of the votes in two poll-
ing units in the Muslim settlement of Angwan Rogo go to the All Pro-
gressives Congress (APC), a party associated with Muslims in Jos. Simi-
larly, most of the votes in the Christian area of Apata go to the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), a political party with strong local Christian 
backing.  
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By contrast, as indicated in the rows representing Ali Kazaure, votes 
are divided in ethnically mixed areas, where local criminals divided along 
ethnic lines work for different political contestants. In Ali Kazaure, there 
is a perpetual struggle between opposing criminal networks working for 
different paymasters for control over what happens at the polling units. 
Rivalling criminal networks from the adjoining settlements come into the 
area to support their co-ethnics in the struggle to gain the upper hand.6 
This external intervention makes the settlement more susceptible to 
contestations than ethnically mixed neighbourhoods that are not located 
between segregated settlements. 
Table 3. Voting Patterns in Ali Kazaure and Adjoining Neighbourhoods in 
2015 General Elections 




Votes per political party 
   APC PDP Others 
Angwan Rogo I  Muslim 756 755 1 0 
Angwan Rogo II Muslim  688 683 2 3 
Ali Kazaure I  Mixed  641 341 300 0 
Ali Kazaure II Mixed  222 173 49 0 
Apata I Christian  800 23 664 113 
Apata II Christian  1,172 77 1,075 20 
Moreover, because of the contiguous boundaries that Ali Kazaure shares 
with the adjacent segregated settlements, both quotidian and formal 
social ties criss-cross their shared boundaries. Memberships of social 
networks including residents’ associations and vigilantes are also cross-
cutting. Some young men in Ali Kazaure are members of the youth asso-
ciations and vigilante groups in Apata, while others are members of the 
youth associations in Yan-Kaji. These cross-neighbourhood member-
ships form along ethnic lines. Criminal networks exhibit patterns similar 
to their civic counterparts – for example, “political thugs” from Angwan 
Rogo and Apata usually collaborate with their co-ethnics within Ali Ka-
zaure to rig elections.7 Within Jos’s ethnically polarised landscape, these 
networks are known for instigating and perpetrating violence in times of 
riots. Through their connections with co-ethnics in Ali Kazaure, crimi-
nals from the segregated settlements find it easy to infiltrate the area 
whenever violence breaks out. As noted earlier, riots represent oppor-
tunities to expel ethnic rivals and establish absolute territorial control.  
6 Interview with local politician, 13 May 2016. 
7 Interview with youth leader, 16 May 2016. 
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Cross-Validating with Other Ethnically Mixed 
Areas
Juxtaposing official reports on incidents of riots, hospital records of 
victims, and interviews with riot participants, survivors, and eyewitnesses 
gives us a fair idea of the spread and levels of violence across the neigh-
bourhoods of Jos. Table 4 shows the recurrence and persistence of vio-
lence across five ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. The frontier settle-
ment of Ali Kazaure is among the most violent areas of Jos. Along with 
Congo-Russia and Nasarawa Gwong – ethnically mixed areas that are 
similarly sandwiched between segregated settlements – Ali Kazaure ex-
perienced major violence during all three episodes of ethnic riots.  
Table 4. Recurrence and Persistence of Violence across Ethnically 
Mixed Neighbourhoods 
Neighbourhood Location 2001 2008 2010 
Ali Kazaure Sandwiched MV MV MV 
Congo-Russia  Sandwiched MV MV MV 
Farin Gada Not sandwiched NV SV SV 
N. Gwong Sandwiched MV MV MV 
Mister Ali  Not sandwiched NV NV SV 
Note: MV = major violence, NV = no violence, SV = sporadic violence. 
To further allay possible concerns that these claims were spurious, we 
cross-checked how dynamics played out in other ethnically mixed set-
tlements. The two goals here were to determine whether ethnically 
mixed areas that fit the profile of the frontier experienced the same level 
of violence as Ali Kazaure and, conversely, whether ethnically mixed 
areas that are not frontiers did not experience similar levels of violence.  
The frontier areas of Nasarawa Gwong and Congo-Russia show 
patterns of violence similar to those experienced in Ali Kazaure. To start 
with, these neighbourhoods, not unlike Ali Kazaure, experienced major 
incidents of violence in all three riot episodes. In all of them, Christian 
and Muslim residents had peace pacts; while these arrangements pre-
vented violence at some initial point, they later collapsed largely due to 
infiltrations by external groups. Figure 2 shows how fighters marched 
into Nasarawa Gwong from the surrounding areas. The different ele-
ments that combined to make Ali Kazaure vulnerable to violence by 
rampaging mobs similarly converged to make Nasarawa Gwong and 
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Congo-Russia sites of persistent violent clashes. Local politicians, crimi-
nals, religious leaders, association representatives, and ordinary residents 
formed coalitions along ethnic lines where underneath the shared objec-
tive of projecting collective interests, each actor is also driven by person-
al goals that, although not advertised, are crucial motivating factors for 
violent action.  
Figure 2. Movements of Armed Mobs into Nasarawa Gwong 
Source: Map created by author. 
The second category of neighbourhoods in the cross-checking process 
includes mixed neighbourhoods that are not sandwiched between segre-
gated areas. Farin Gada and Mister Ali fall into this group. These areas 
are either bordered by other mixed settlements or physical (natural or 
artificial) boundaries in the form of main roads or open spaces. Compara-
tively, these neighbourhoods experienced far less violence than Ali Ka-
zaure or any of the other frontier areas. Apart from looting and destruc-
tion around the market area, Farin Gada experienced only isolated 
attacks in 2008, which were quickly contained. There was also some low-
level violence in 2010, but nothing compared to what happened in the 
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frontier areas.8 Mister Ali experienced a lot of tension and low-level 
violence in 2010, but this was as far as the riots affected the area.9 Neither 
settlement ridded itself of internal rancour. Many residents wanted to 
fight, but intergroup dialogues and joint patrols successfully prevented 
would-be troublemakers from plunging the area into chaos.10 However, 
more crucial to explaining the relative calm that reigned in these areas 
while other parts of the city burned was the absence of external influ-
ence, which can be attributed to the location of these areas.  
The struggles in Ali Kazaure are complex and multifaceted, involv-
ing different actors from both within and outside the neighbourhood. 
Local politicians, criminals, religious leaders, representatives of ethnic 
associations, neighbourhood leaders, and ordinary residents all come 
together to engage in a battle of wills where ethnic identity remains the 
most important consideration in building coalitions. The nature and 
complexity of these alliances echoes Brass’s (2004) riot systems and 
Berenschot’s (2011) patronage networks. In situating these civic systems 
and networks in the frontier settlement of Ali Kazaure, this article show-
cases how the prevailing atmosphere of ethnic competition in the city is 
most acutely brought to life in this type of socio-spatial setting. 
Conclusion  
This article explored the dynamics of ethnic conflict in one of the most 
violent areas of Jos. In doing so, it demonstrated that besides a given 
neighbourhood’s ethnic composition, its location in relation to adjacent 
settlements is crucial for understanding why violence occurs more in 
some areas. The article used the metaphor of the frontier to explain why 
Ali Kazaure, an ethnically mixed neighbourhood sandwiched between 
segregated rivalling Christian and Muslim settlements, experienced more 
recurrent and persistent violence than others. This concluding section 
reiterates some essential aspects of the argument, highlights their aca-
demic and practical relevance, and suggests possible directions for fur-
ther study. 
One of this article’s key contributions lies in showing the usefulness 
of the concept of the frontier in explaining how a particular socio-spatial 
setting can enhance armed mobs’ usage of violence in negotiating coex-
istence in an ethnically polarised urban setting. The concept has helped 
8 Interviews in Farin Gada, 31 March 2016. 
9 Interview with resident in Mister Ali, 30 March 2016. 
10 Interviews with vigilante in Mister Ali, 30 March 2016. 
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us to make sense of how Ali Kazaure’s demographic and locational at-
tributes affected civic networks and their repertoire of territorial and 
political performances in the context of ethnic violence. The second 
contribution is practical in nature and concerns how authorities ought to 
respond to conflict and violence in different socio-spatial contexts. On 
the basis of the findings, it becomes quite clear that certain responses 
and approaches are more appropriate for particular contexts. On the 
basis of this understanding, authorities can predict where violence is 
likely to occur and act proactively. 
Another key contribution of the article is its illustration that differ-
ent socio-spatial contexts – ethnic strongholds and frontiers – differen-
tially affect the production of violence. Neither context, arguably, is less 
important than the other. Behaviour patterns of groups differ in the two 
settings, but it is difficult for violence to be instigated – much less sus-
tained – without actors from the two contexts playing complementary 
roles. In the contested political landscape of Jos, the segregated settle-
ments were conducive to forging ethnic solidarity and marshalling foot 
soldiers. The ethnic strongholds of Jos proved to be territories where 
ethnic egotism thrives and both formal and quotidian social networks 
fuse into fronts for pushing ethnic interests, both politically and violent-
ly. Complementarily, the frontier was a setting for whetting rivalry and 
contestations, and consequently became the battleground.  
We also observed that although joint patrols by Christian and Mus-
lim residents in some ethnically mixed parts of Nasarawa Gwong such as 
Duala and Angwan Keke initially helped keep the peace, these arrange-
ments could not stand the heat when the violence escalated. The sustain-
ability of joint patrols and other ad hoc civilian violence-prevention ef-
forts depends on the intensity of violence, with the success rate 
diminishing as violence intensifies. However, it is logical that size also 
makes a difference. The larger a group, the more capacity it has to invade 
or to prevent invasion. For example, a joint patrol in a small ethnically 
mixed neighbourhood can hardly withstand a large army of irate youth 
from much larger segregated neighbourhoods bent on invading the area. 
However, a populous ethnically mixed area can mobilise a patrol formid-
able enough to keep smaller armed groups at bay.  
This article is an initial step in exploring how the ethnic composi-
tion of a neighbourhood, combined with its location in relation to ad-
joining areas of similar or dissimilar ethnic composition, affects its vul-
nerability to violence. We used the metaphor of the frontier to explain 
why ethnically mixed areas sandwiched between rivalling segregated areas 
experience more recurrent and persistent violence. To better understand 
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riots at the frontier, we also need to examine the micro-level mechanics 
of violent networks. This would require looking at trans-neighbourhood 
social networks, their spatial patterns, and the corresponding implica-
tions for the mobility of armed networks within and across neighbour-
hoods during riots. Another direction for further enquiry is to see if 
there are not-so-obvious variations in the manifestation of the frontier. 
Such an effort could help produce a typology of frontiers. That, in turn, 
would open into a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of ethnic 
violence – specifically, how demography and geography influence group 
behavioural patterns and shape the production of violence. 
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Grenzen ethnischer Gewalt in einer afrikanischen Stadt: 
Erklärungen für die Ausbreitung und Wiederholung von  
Gewaltkonflikten in Jos, Nigeria 
 
Zusammenfassung: Forschung zu ethnischer Gewalt hat gezeigt, dass 
ethnisch durchmischte Siedlungsgebiete anfälliger für kollektive Gewalt 
sind als segregierte. Diese Schlussfolgerung basiert auf Studien, die das 
Ausmaß der Gewalt zwischen segregierten und durchmischten Orten 
vergleichen. Im Gegensatz dazu ist völlig unklar, wie sich Varianz bei der 
Verbreitung von Gewalt in ethnisch durchmischten Gebieten erklären 
lässt. Um diese Varianz zu erläutern, schlagen wir einen Ansatz vor, der 
nicht nur die ethnische Zusammensetzung eines Viertels untersucht, 
sondern auch seinen Nachbarschaft zu Vierteln mit ähnlicher oder un-
terschiedlicher ethnischer Zusammensetzung und deren gemeinsame 
Grenzen einbezieht. Basierend auf ethnographischer Feldforschung in 
Jos, einer nigerianischen Stadt, die wiederkehrende Gewaltkonflikt erlebt 
hat, zeigen wir, dass ethnisch gemischte Gebiete, die sich zwischen seg-
regierten Orten befinden, mehr Gewaltausbrüche erfahren als durch-
mischte Viertel ohne eine vergleichbare Nachbarschaft. Daraus lassen 
sich wichtige wissenschaftliche und praktische Schlussfolgerungen ablei-
ten. 
 
Schlagwörter: Nigeria, Jos, gewaltsamer Konflikt, ethnische Gewalt, 
Unruhen 
